TERRORISM: A
SYSTEMIC VIEW
Russell L. Ackoff* and
Broadly speaking “terrorism” is regarded as extremely violent behavior
by what is normally considered to be a minority subgroup of society. The
value system in which terrorism is imbedded is not universally shared
within the larger society from which it emanates. Terrorists form a
movement that pursues a cause defined by its aims which, in turn, are
defined within a value framework that may be political, religious,
social or economic.
Its objective is
to obtain acceptance of its value system and its aims. In pursuit of
this objective it applies violence aimed at creating terror and anxiety
in one or more target societies.
A major factor in the success of
terrorism lies in the fear and social paralysis it induces. Through the
media, particularly television, the terror produced is rapidly
disseminated through a large part of the world. Instantaneous global
dissemination by the media, particularly television, of news of
terrorist acts promotes the aims of terrorism. Terrorists thrive on
exposure of their message. The connections created by the media between
most parts of the world directly favors terrorism. There is no better
example than CNN and the September 11 attacks on the USA, which allowed
a global audience to witness first hand terrorism in progress, in real
time. Through violence terrorism conducts what is primarily a
psychological war directed at affecting the mind and the behavior of
publics.
Those who sympathize with terrorists see
them as freedom fighters. They create an environment in which terrorist
movements are supported and flourish.
In practice there is usually a
mixture of political, social, economic and religious values involved in
terrorist movements. The Israeli problem is due to a combination of
these forms of terrorism, each re-inforcing the other. The
freedom-fighter form of terrorism, as was experienced in South Africa,
was motivated by an inability of the majority of its population to deal
with the complexity of their “oppression” and quashing of their civil
and personal “rights.” The terrorism currently emanating from some
Muslim societies is a reaction to the “oppression” of suppression of
religious values and “rights,” among other things.
Although almost all terrorists are
fundamentalists less than a majority of fundamentalists are
terrorists. Therefore, to understand terrorism it is necessary to
understand the nature of fundamentalism and its principal
manifestations.
FUNDAMENTALISM
Fundamentalism is a response to a
rapidly changing and increasingly complex environment, a chaotic or
turbulent environment, and the uncertainty it breeds. Fundamentalists
cannot cope with such an environment and, therefore, remove the need for
doing so by accepting a set of beliefs that identify an exhaustive set
of meaningful questions, answers to them, and the acceptable modes of
behavior to which the answers imply. All other questions are dismissed
as irrelevant and all other answers and acts are considered to be
wrong. There are no alternatives worth consideration. Therefore, this
set of beliefs relieves those who accept it of the need to think and
choose amongst alternatives. Acceptance of the doctrine is not a matter
of thought but of uncompromising faith. This doctrine becomes dogma, the
only “truth”.
The fundamentalist dogma is usually
the product of a living or dead guru of whom the followers are
disciples. The disciples often form a cult that further separates them
from others in their society. Their cult-like behavior increases the
chasm between them and the "others."
The increased connectedness of the
parts of the world has increasingly confronted previously isolated
fundamentalist groups with external forces and influences that they
cannot manage given their constraining worldviews. They cannot deal with
the ambiguity and diversity presented to them. They cannot manage
within a society in which ambiguity and diversity prevail without
resorting to a change- and complexity-reducing doctrine, one that does
not require them to change, to adapt.
Not only do the fundamentalists reject
prevailing value systems, but the societies with which they engage also
reject their value systems. This conflict cycle is aggravated by the
increasing connectedness of the world. In the past, due to distance and
lack less immediate communication, local belief and value systems were
more isolated and were not confronted with the demands and differences
of a wider, more “advanced” set of beliefs and values. It becomes
increasingly difficult to hold onto a belief and value system that is at
variance with that of the main stream of thought.
British psychiatrist, Ronald Laing (1967)
saw the attitude of fundamentalists as follows:
The brotherhood of
man…seldom extends to all men. In the name of our freedom and our
brotherhood we are prepared to blow up the other half of mankind, and to
be blown up in turn.
The matter is of life
and death importance in the most urgent possible sense, since it is on
the basis of such primitive social fantasies of who and what are I and
you, he and she, We and They, that the world is linked or separated,
that we die, kill, devour, tear and are torn apart, descend into hell or
ascend to heaven, in short, that we conduct our lives. (pp. 93-94)
Brian Eno, interviewed by Dan Joy (1994),
characterized fundamentalism as follows:
Fundamentalists say, "My
picture of the world necessarily will answer every question."
Necessarily. There is not a type of question that couldn't be covered
by this theory, whatever it happens to be….The pragmatist is saying:
"Well, look, it doesn't work. I don't care what you believe, this is
not working." And the fundamentalists say: "It must work. It will
work."….What normally happens is that when it doesn't work, and it's
conspicuously not working, they say, " It's because we're not doing it
right. It's not because the theory is wrong. It's because we aren't
doing it with enough purity." (pp. 12-15)
Types of Fundamentalism
Fundamentalists are of two basic
types, introverted and extroverted.
Introverted
fundamentalists want to be left alone to follow their beliefs in
privacy. They try to minimize interactions with non-believers and live
in collective solitary confinement. They do not try to proselytize or
otherwise affect "outsiders," but they do invite inquiries and
conversions. They are nonviolent. Examples are the Amish and Carmelite
nuns.
Extroverted fundamentalists try to convert non-believers in
order to create a supportive environment. They include missionaries who
try to convert non-believers peacefully. Those who use force either to
convert non-believers or to expel them from their environments are
terrorists. Hitler's Nazis, the members of Hamas, and the Klu Klux Klan
in the United States are examples of fundamentalists who resort to
violence.
RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
Actual and potential victims of terrorism tend to respond to terrorism
in several different ways: by the use of violence against them, by their
capture and imprisonment, and by protecting possible targets.
The
Use of Violence against Violence
Most efforts to deal with violent
terrorists consist of turning violence back onto them. Witness Israel
in Palestine, South Africa's past war on black liberation forces, and
the United States in Afghanistan. In this way a continuing tit-for-tat
exchange is initiated which tends to exacerbate the conflict and take it
further away from the possibility of a peaceful settlement of
differences. Violence turned onto terrorists tends to strengthen their
resolve and make their recruiting easier, especially when the violence
used against terrorists has innocent civilian victims.
Amongst people who have a loose identification with the fundamentalist
cause, a violent response increases sympathy with the movement and its
aims because the response is seen as unjust.
Responding with violence to a fundamentalist movement simply demonstrate
to its sympathizers that the terrorists’ position and claims are
justified. A violent response therefore tends to increase local support of terrorism,
especially among those who are potential victims of retaliatory
violence.
Apprehension and Imprisonment of Terrorists
One way of dealing with terrorists
is directed at capturing and incarcerating them. The
United States makes such an effort despite the fact that
such treatment of criminals has failed completely. The United States
has a higher percentage of its population in prison than any other
industrialized nation. Nevertheless, it has the highest crime rate.
Convicts released from
U.S. prisons have a higher probability of committing a
crime than they had when apprehended, and the crime they are like to
commit is more serious than the one for which they were put in prison.
Prison, it turns out, is a school for criminals. There is no reason to
believe that captured terrorists whom are treated in the same way or
worse than criminals will respond differently. Capture plus punitive
imprisonment is very likely to begin a tit-for-tat strategy with
individual terrorists. Moreover, unlike a released prisoner who usually
receives little or no encouragement from society to give up a life of
crime, the released terrorist is often treated in the society to which
he/she returns as a martyr and is encouraged by others to re-engage in
terrorism. The harsh treatment of terrorists significantly increases
their dedication to their cause and grass roots support of
their efforts.
Protecting Potential Targets
Efforts to protect potential
targets of terrorists from attack are futile for two reasons. First,
there are more such targets than can possibly be effectively protected
and, second, it is always easier to destroy something than prevent its
destruction, particularly when terrorists are willing to sacrifice
themselves in a destructive act. It is virtually impossible to protect
against suicide bombers and assassins.
An effective short-term defense against
terrorism has yet to be developed. Furthermore, those that appear to
have some deterrent value are a financial burden that few nations can
afford.
This is not meant to imply that we should
not make terrorist attacks as difficult as possible and that we should
not prepare to minimize the harm caused by their attacks when they
occur. But such efforts will not "solve" the problem.
To make the tasks of terrorists as
difficult as possible we have to think like terrorists, not like anti
terrorists. For example, terrorists are not likely to be using
sophisticated econometric models to select vulnerable targets, as is
being done by some who are trying to protect against terrorist attacks.
In fact, terrorists are unlikely to attack a national economy directly
for two reasons.
First, the institutions and behavior that make up a national economy are
dispersed and robust. There is no small number of economic targets
destruction of which can bring an economy down. Witness the attacks on
the World Trade Center in New York City.
Second, by spreading terror among
consumers, as terrorists are doing in Israel, they can have a much
greater impact on an economy than by attacking economic institutions.
Finally, the CEOs of some of the major
corporations in the United States are doing much more to hurt the US
economy than any number of terrorists' attacks could.
The world has become a much more tightly
knit system. This makes it more vulnerable to disruption when a part
(an airport, an air traffic control system, electricity supply, water
supply, a city, etc) is disrupted. There are virtually an unlimited
number of targets destruction of which can have a large impact on the
containing society and others. These targets are increasingly
accessible with large amounts of information about them readily
available. Developed societies for the most part are more open and more
vulnerable than less developed society such as those from which
terrorists seem to arise.
Disruptive Responses to Terrorism
Since 9/11 there have
been many legal, economic and related interventions aimed at disrupting
the functioning of al-Qaeda. The assumptions underlying even short term,
quick-to-results, but less fundamental responses, require rethinking.
One of the most
important assumptions that requires rethinking is the way we think
terrorism is organized. The importance of the organisational models or
metaphors we entertain, mostly implicitly an unconsciously, in our
responses to terrorism must not be underestimated. The models of
organisation we use to make sense of our business, public institutions,
and even social movements are not appropriate for comprehending the
"organisation" of terrorism movements. These movements should be seen as
networks, not organizations, of collaborating and communicating
communities. Whereas organizations consist of essential parts any one
of which, if destroyed, disrupts the functioning of the whole, networks
have no parts on which functioning of the whole depends. (Removal of a
motor from an automobile -a system- prevents it from operating but
breaking a telephone line between two cities -a link in a network- does
not eliminate communication between them. They can communicate through
a third city with links to both cities affected.)
Terrorist networks
consist of groups that, loosely or more tightly, share a set of values
and norms. The members of the network are mostly members by birthright,
or from long term demonstrated acceptance of the norms, values and
required behavior of network members. Between nodes of the network there
is a sense of sharing in an overall cause. The nodes communicate and
collaborate not only around the cause, but also around dealing with
various needs as they emerge. Trust, kinship, duty and loyalty play a
dominant part in determining membership.
It is important to
understand the difference between a network and an organisation. The
importance in developing responses to terrorism is illustrated by the
privacy-protection laws of the United States. These laws were used to
prevent the FBI from obtaining a search warrant for Moussaoui on the
grounds that there was no proof that he was a member of a known
terrorist organisation. (Elliot, 2002, p36) The notion of membership in
an organisation (in contrast to being part of a network) is
inappropriate when dealing with terrorists.
Attacking the Causes of Terrorism
The ways of combating terrorism described above attempt to reduce its
effects; they do not address its causes.
Addressing the causes of terrorism requires a change of focus.
A metaphor illustrates
what we mean. When a body's immune system is weakened through stress, an
opening for an opportunistic disease to take root is created. This
metaphor translated means that the inability to promote development
within a society makes it susceptible to the infection of terrorism.
Awareness of this is necessary for developing a long-term sustainable
approach to terrorism.
Terrorism is a
problem that cannot be addressed successfully within any one nation.
It is a global problem that can destroy society faster than
pollution or the exhaustion of resources. The 9/11 attack on the World
Trade Center in the United States is the first, not the last, attack on
the nation. Even if the United States succeeded in eliminating al-Qaeda
it would not thereby eliminate terrorism. But it cannot even eliminate
al-Qaeda acting alone.
A principal (but not the sole) producer of terrorism is the inequitable
distribution among nations of wealth, quality of life, and opportunities
to improve either.
This is reflected in a recent study by The Heritage Foundation (The
2002 Index of Economic Freedom) found that the production of
terrorists by nations is negatively correlated with their economic
freedom which, in turn, is correlated with their economic development.
The bottom six nations are Iran, Laos, Cuba, Libya, Iraq, and North
Korea.
To be sure, western institutions such as the IMF and World Bank have
been trying to encourage and facilitate development of less developed
countries. However, they have been doing so in a way based on two false
assumptions: (1) that they know best what less developed countries
should do to accelerate their development, and (2) if they did know this
that they should tell the less developed countries what to do.
No amount of evidence disconfirming the first assumption seems to shake
it. The second assumption deprives the less developed country of the
opportunity to learn from its mistakes, which is the most efficient way
to learn. We do not learn from doing something right because,
obviously, we already know how to do it. Repetition provides
confirmation of what we already know and this has value but it does not
constitute learning. Furthermore, although we can learn from others, it
is not nearly as efficient as learning from one's own mistakes. For
example, telling a child not to touch a hot stove is not nearly as
effective as is the child touching it and getting burned. No amount of
instruction on how to ride a bicycle is as good as trying to ride one
and learning in the process. We learn a great deal more from our own
experiences than we do from that of others, particularly those who were
raised in a different culture. In addition, instruction from those who
consider themselves superiors to those that they instruct increases the
feeling of inferiority and associated resentment among those being
instructed.
The ability of individuals and groups to cope emotionally and
conceptually with the increasing demands of a turbulent environment is
directly related to their level of development. We use “development”
to refer to an individual's and group’s ability to effectively utilize
available resources to satisfy their needs and desires, and those of
others. This includes, but is not limited to, the conceptual and
emotional abilities required to deal with increasingly complex
situations.
Value systems and frameworks or worldviews develop in response to
the demands of a particular epoch. But every worldview and the pattern
of thinking it involves eventually create dilemmas, problems that cannot
be solved within that worldview. Einstein once noted that the problems
created by our current way of thinking cannot be solved by that way of
thinking. Competently dealing with these emerging dilemmas requires a
paradigm shift, a shift in the way we think, in ways of conceptualizing
reality, and in our value framework. Such shifts normally emerge out of
social conversations. We use “conversation" to mean a fundamental
discourse aimed at revealing a new ways of perceiving and dealing with a
complex situation.
To illustrate this dynamic one can reflect on the situation in South
Africa which gave rise to the apartheid policies, that that in turn
produced socially and politically motivated terrorism in this country.
In essence, a value system, quite acceptable in the 1800s in “Western”
societies, was established in the southern end of Africa. Due to the
lack of tight integration with the “parent” societies these values
systems influenced local politics while the value systems of the parent
societies moved on. The world response to apartheid involved
political, economic and cultural isolation of South Africa. This served
to further isolate and sustain its then-prevalent value system. Such
isolation reduced the level of conversation with the outside world and
ultimately retarded the development of an appropriate value system and
worldview.
DEVELOPMENT AS AN ANTIDOTE TO TERRORISM
We know how to facilitate
development of disadvantaged communities in both more and less developed
countries.
We have done so in disadvantaged
neighborhoods in developed countries (Ackoff, 1974) and in Indian
villages in Mexico. The extension of the method employed in these small
societies to larger social systems presents no problems that lie outside
the minds of people.
The procedure involves 5 steps.
1. The more developed should make available to those less
developed a pool of resources — financial, human, and equipment — that
can be used in development efforts, but only in ways the recipients see
fit, not the donors.
2. These resources can only be used for development.
3. Decisions on how to use these resources must be made
democratically by those who will be directly affected by the decisions,
and must be approved by others who will be indirectly affected by it.
4. No corruption is permissible. Its presence should be a
sufficient reason for discontinuation of the development effort.
5. The effort should be monitored and evaluated by an objective
group whose members are acceptable to both the recipients and the donors
of the aid.
Now consider these conditions in some detail.
Resources.
Each developed country should have an agency to administer development
programs. It should receive and processes applications for aid. A
United Nations agency could help by directing applications to
appropriate national and international sources. Action should be
prompt. Negative responses should not preclude a proposal from being
submitted to a different source.
A percentage of the income tax collected in each more developed country
should be designated for investment in equalizing development among
nations. Institutions and organizations receiving aid or contracts from
the government of more developed countries should provide human
resources as required on projects. Personnel time and expenses as well
as the cost of equipment should be paid for out of project grants.
Development.
As noted above, by 'development' we mean an increase in the ability and
desire to satisfy one's own needs and legitimate desires and those of
others. A legitimate desire is one the fulfillment of which does not
obstruct the development of any others. A need is a requirement for
something necessary for maintenance of health or survival. It may or
may not be desired. Calcium and zinc, for example, may be needed but
not desired because of ignorance. On the other hand, many desires have
no corresponding need, for example, the many luxuries enjoyed in a more
developed society. Development, then, is an increase in competence.
"Omnicompetence," the ability to obtain whatever one wants or needs, is
an unattainable but continuously approachable ideal in which means and
ends converge. It is necessarily an ideal for all of mankind, past,
present or future because no one can want anything, including the
absence of desire, without wanting the ability to obtain it.
Pursuit of development has four necessary aspects:
1. Science and
technology: the search for truth, knowledge which enables us
to pursue our needs and desires efficiently.
2. Economics: the search for plenty (the
cornucopia), the resources required to use the knowledge that science
and technology provides.
3.
Ethics/morality:
the effort to promote cooperation and eliminate conflict within
and between individuals and groups.
4.
Aesthetics:
the provision of (i) inspiration, the willingness to pursue
ideals, objectives which can never be attained but can be approached
without limit' and (ii) fun, the pleasure derived from whatever
activity is engaged in, the pauses that refresh. Therefore, aesthetics
has both creative and recreative aspects.
Development is a
carriage drawn by these four horses. It can move no faster then the
slowest of the horses. Therefore, effort and resources must be
allocated to each of the four aspects of development.
Democracy.
Democratic decision making involves the following three principles:
1. Everyone who is directly
affected by a decision can participate in making it either directly or
indirectly through representatives they select. Advocates of their
interests, for example, parents should represent children and
psychiatrists should represent the mentally ill.
2. Every decision-making body can do whatever it wants
providing it does not affect any other individual or group. If what it
wants to do can have such an effect, then approval of those affected
must be obtained before it can be done.
3. Anyone in a position of authority over others in a
decision-making body is subject to the collective authority of the
others. That is, authority is circular, not linear, flowing up
collectively as well as down individually.
Corruption
consists of the appropriation for personal gain of resources intended
for use in development of a group and its members. Corruption is
rampant in many less developed countries where it is a major obstruction
to development. It also produces a feeling of futility in many and thus
provides a fertile soil for terrorism. It should be disallowed and
those guilty of it should be treated as criminals. Its presence should
be sufficient ground for discontinuing a project.
Monitoring should be directed at
facilitating learning by those whose development is intended. In order
to do this a record should be prepared for each development-intended
decision. That record should include (a) who made the decision, when
and how; (b) the intended effects of the decision and when they are
expected; (c) the assumptions on which these expectations are based; and
(d) the inputs that were used in making the decision: the data,
information, knowledge, understanding, and/or wisdom used.
The monitors should then track the expectations and assumptions. When a
significant deviation from these is found it should be diagnosed to find
what produced it. The decision-making body should then take corrective
action. A record should also be prepared for such a correction and
should be processed just as the original decision was. This makes it
possible not only to learn from a mistake, but also to learn from
mistakes in correcting mistakes, therefore, to learn how to learn.
The development process described here
provides a context within with there is an interaction and conversation
by the wider society with its less developed parts. It enables a
community to build new value frameworks, a new way of thinking, and a
new worldview that enable its members to better deal with their needs
and aspirations in their turbulent environments. This development
process is a process of engagement and discourse, not one of rejection
and isolation, which ultimately retards emergence of appropriate value
systems.
Development is a matter of learning, increasing one's
competence. Therefore, a development process must be rooted in
education.
However, societies that breed terrorism tend to be authoritarian,
autocratic, or paternalistic at best, and such societies usually
restrict or discourage education. They tend to prohibit discussion of
alternatives to their current form of governance. These tendencies
promote incompetence, exploitation and corruption. They also promote
organizational forms that aid terrorism. They preclude the introduction
of forms of societal organization that promote openness, good
governance, and tolerance for democratic processes.
Development programs should involve a
global collaborative effort. One of the characteristics of the world
that terrorists exploit is its division by political boundaries. As
long as the world remains politically fragmented it remains possible to
find safe havens for terrorists. The reduction or elimination of
terrorism requires a global response that addresses the roots of
injustice and inequities within and between nations..
CONCLUSION
We have argued that a way to reduce
terrorism is to promote development in societies that breed terrorists.
Movement toward equalization of wealth, quality of life, and
opportunities to increase these would go a long way to reducing
terrorism. But even if this were not the case, what would be
accomplished is desirable.
Development projects should be designed and
managed by those whose development is intended. They can learn more
from their own trial and error than they can from the successes of
others. However, they should have as much access to the expertise of
others as they desire, but none that is imposed on them. Nevertheless,
there are conditions that should be imposed on the recipients of the aid
proposed here, conditions that assure learning and development.
Engagement in the development process itself will contribute
significantly to development.
A developed country can tolerate and
incorporate introverted and non-violent extroverted fundamentalists but
not terrorists, indigenous or foreign. A pluralistic democracy can
house disciples of even fundamentalist doctrines. Conformity and
consistency are virtues only to fundamentalists.
REFERENCES
Ackoff, Russell, L., Redesigning
the Future. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974.
Elliot, Michael, " They had a plan",
TIME August 12, 2002, -pp24-37.
Joy, Dan, "Interview of Brian Eno,"
OPAL Information, No. 25, 1994, pp. 12-16.
Laing, R. D, The Politics of
Experience. New York: Ballentine Books, 1967.
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